considered to constitute 'suicide.' Included within the liberty interest we examine, is for example, the act of refusing or terminating unwanted medical treatment" (p. 9). Indeed, the level of generality chosen by the court in defining the question to be addressed was not simply important in resolving the issue of whether the "right-to-die" is a liberty interest protected by the Constitution, but was actually outcome determinative of the question. As one commentator on American constitutional law has written, "Insofar as the right of personhood is limited to liberties long revered as fundamental in our society, it makes all the difference in the world what level of generality one employs to test the pedigree of an asserted liberty claim."5 In other words, this commentator continued, "It is crucial, in asking whether an alleged right forms part of a traditional liberty, to define the liberty at a high enough level of generality to permit unconventional variants to claim protection along with mainstream versions of protected conduct."6
The recurring issue confronting the United States Supreme Court and all lower federal courts is what standard to apply in determining whether a particular activity is protected within the scope of the liberty specified by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 7 In attempting to ascertain whether an activity should be classified as a "fundamental liberty" and therefore protected from state prohibition or infringement, the Supreme Court has stated that the interest to be protected must be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if [such liberties] were sacrificed" and "where they are characterized as those liberties that are deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."8 Like the "right to abortion", the "right to die" is nowhere to be found in the United States Constitution. To the contrary, for most of the constitutional history of the United States, states not only refused to recognize such activity as a "right", but the state governments imposed criminal penalties on those involved in such activity. Thus, if the conduct is narrowly defined, that is, defined so as to limit the description of the so-called "liberty" interest to the conduct at issue and to no other more generally accepted conduct, then it is very difficult to regard the conduct as a "liberty" since it traditionally has been criminalized by the state.
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court rejected such a close historical context for the definition of the liberty interest at issue. The Supreme Court stated, "It is ... tempting . .. to suppose that the [Constitution] protects only those practices, defined at the most specific level, that were protected against government interference by other rules oflaw when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified ... But such a view would be inconsistent with our law. It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter."9 The circuit court quoted this language with approval in Compassion in Dying v. Washington and went on to observe that had the Supreme Court not taken such a broad view of what constitutes liberty, "it would not have held that women have a right to have an abortion [since] as the dissent pointed out in Roe v. Wade, more than three-quarters of the existing states (at least 28 out of 37 states); as well as eight territorial legislatures restricted or prohibited abortions in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted" (p.
13).
Moreover, the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence was found to be persuasive in another important aspect. The Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood Y. Casey re-affirmed the constitutional right to abortion. It did so by replacing the notion of "privacy" as the constitutional principle which encompassed a "right" to abortion with a broad, seemingly open-ended concept of liberty. After reviewing its decisions related to marriage, contraception, abortion, family relationships and child rearing, the Supreme Court stated, "These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State."10
The circuit court found this analysis broad enough to extend beyond the issue of abortion and include the "right to die." According to the circuit court, "the decision how and when to die is one of 'the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,' a choice 'central to personal dignity and autonomy.' A competent terminally ill adult, having lived nearly the full measure of his life, has a strong liberty interest in choosing a dignified and humane death rather than being reduced at the end of his existence to a childlike state of helplessness, diapered, sedated, incontinent. How a person dies not only determines the nature of the final period of his existence, but in many cases, the enduring memories held by those who love him" (p. 19).
In holding that a "right to die" is protected by the Constitution, the circuit court also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Cruzan Y. Director, Missouri Department of Health. 11 In Cruzan, the parents of a young woman in a persistent vegetative state sought a court order entitling them to terminate the artificial nutrition and hydration procedures the hospital was providing to their daughter. The Supreme Court observed that while "a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment," 12 and that therefore "the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition"13 the question was not automatically resolved in favor of the parents' request. The Supreme Court noted that "an incompetent person is not able to make an informed and voluntary choice to exercise a hypothetical right to refuse treatment or any other right. Such a 'right' must be exercised for her, if at all, by some sort of surrogate."14 The State of Missouri had recognized in its law that a surrogate may act on behalf of a patient to refuse or terminate life-prolonging hydration and nutrition, but the state had required that the surrogate's action must conform to the wishes of the patient. In addition, the law required that the surrogate show by "clear and convincing" evidence that such was the wish of the patient. Thus, in Cruzan the Supreme Court limited its ruling to the question of whether such a procedural requirement of the state was an infringement upon the patient's constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving treatment. The Court held that such a high evidentiary standard did not violate the Constitution. August, 1996 Although in Cruzan the Supreme Court ruled only on the narrow issue of whether the state's evidentiary standard to ascertain the patients' desire to terminate treatment was unconstitutionally strict, the dissenting and concurring opinions of justices raised issues that would resurfaoe in Compassion in Dying. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia directly disputed the contention of the dissenting justices that "the state has no legitimate general interest in someone's life . .. that could outweigh the person's choice to avoid medical treatment." Justice Scalia insisted that while the dissenter's proposition sounded "moderate enough" it could not be "logically" limited to only the circumstances of the Cruzan case. He argued that if one agrees with the dissenter's view that the general interest of the State in protecting life must always yield to the indi vidual's particularized and intense interest in self-determination to refuse medical treatment, then "he must also believe that the Stae must accede to her particularized and intense interest in self-determinia1.ion in her choice whether to continue living or to die . .. It seems to me, "Justice Scalia continued, that the dissenters' position "ultimately rests upon the proposition that it is none of the State's business if a person wants to commit suicide ... But it is not a view imposed by our constitutional traditions, in which the power of the State to prohibit suicide is unquestionable."l?
In Compassion in Dying, the circuit court held that "the principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment" articulated by the Supreme Court in Cruzan should be applied to the question of physician-assisted suicide (p. 19). With virtually no analysis, the circuit court simply announced that "we conclude that Cruzan, by recognizing a liberty interest that includes the refusal of artificial provisio,n of life~sustaining food and water, necessarily recognizes a liberty IOterest 10 hastemng one's own death" (p. 20). The circuit court, however, failed to explain why this should be so. Nor did the court explain why it is that the common law prohibition of suicide existed alongside that of the common law right to be free of medical treatment without consent. Both principles reach back beyond the American constitutional tradition to the English common law.
After having asserted a constitutionally protected "liberty interest in hastening one's own death," the circuit court then considered six interests of the state to determine whether one or more of those interests outweighed the individual's liberty interest. As defined by the circuit court these interests were: "( 1) the state's general interest in preserving life; (2) the state's more specific interest in preventing suicide; (3) the state's interest in avoiding the involvement of third parties and in precluding the use of arbitrary, unfair, or undue influence; (4) the state's interest in protecting family members and loved ones; (5) the state's interest in protecting the integrity of the medical profession; and (6) the state's interest in avoiding adverse consequences that might ensue if the statutory provision at issue is declared unconstitutional." The circuit court concluded that in no instance did the state interest or any combination of state interests outweigh the individual's "liberty interest in hastening one's own death". The original three-judge panel which heard the appeal from the federal district court decision had upheld the Washington law. Judge Noonan, author of the original circuit court opinion, found all of the above state interests to be substantial and sufficient to sustain the Washington State law. In particular, Judge Noonan found persuasive the Supreme Court's determination in Cruzan that "there can be no gainsaying" a state's interest "in the protection and preservation of human life".18 Significantly for Judge Noonan, the Supreme Court cited in support of its determination that "the majority of States in this country have laws imposing criminal penalties on one who assists another in criminal suicide."19 Another important state interest enumerated by Judge Noonan was the interest in protecting the poor, racial minorities, the handicapped and the elderly from exploitation and pressure. In reaching this conclusion Judge Noonan agreed with the conclusions of the New York State Task Force on Life and Law report, When Death is Sought: Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Medical Context. The Task Force appointed by the Governor of New York in 1984 unanimously recommended that New York laws prohibiting assisted suicide and euthanasia should not be changed. It concluded that "No matter how carefully any guidelines are framed, assisted suicide and euthanasia will be practiced through the prism of social inequality and bias that characterizes the delivery of services . . . The practices will pose the greatest risks to those who are poor, elderly, members of a minority groUp."20
Perhaps most importantly, the Task Force identified four major factors contributing to the clinical background of the medical context regarding physician-assisted suicide. First, the Task force found that "Contrary to what many believe, the vast majority of individuals who are terminally ill or facing severe pain or disability are not suicidal. Moreover, terminally ill patients who do desire suicide or euthanasia often suffer from a treatable mental disorder, most commonly depression. When these patients receive appropriate treatment for depression, they usually abandon the wish to commit suicide." Second, the Task Force concluded that "Uncontrolled pain, particularly when accompanied by feelings of hopelessness and untreated depression, is a significant contributing factor for suicide . .. Medications and pain relief techniques now make it possible to treat pain effectively for most patients." Third, the Task force determined that "Despite the fact that effective treatments are available, severely and terminally ill patients generally do not receive adequate relief from pain." And fourth, the Task Force stated the "Numerous barriers contribute to the pervasive inadequacy of pain relief and palliative care in current clinical practice, including a lack of professional knowledge and training, unjustified fears about physical and psychological dependence, poor pain assessment, pharmacy practices, and the reluctance of patients and their families to seek pain relief."21 In regard to the fourth finding the Task Force noted that "The provision of pain medication is legally acceptable even if it may hasten the patient's death, if the medication is intended to alleviate pain (pain) not to cause death."22 However, the Ninth Circuit Court rejected such concerns and instead concluded that "even though the protection of life is one of the state's most important functions, the state's interest is dramatically diminished if the person it seeks to protect is terminally ill .. . and has expressed a wish that he be permitted to die ... When patients are no longer able to pursue liberty or happiness and do not wish to pursue life, the state's interest in forcing them to remain alive is clearly less compelling" (p. 22). Moreover, the circuit dismissed the concern regarding possible exploitation of historically disadvantaged groups such as the elderly, handicapped and minorities, saying merely that "The argument that disadvantaged persons will receive more medical services than the remainder of the population in one, and only one, area -assisted ~,uicide -is ludicrous on its face" (p. 27).
Quill v. Vacco
Quill v Vacco involved a challenge to a New York State statute which provides that a person is guilty of manslaughter when "he intentionally . . . aids another person to commit suicide."23 The Second Circuit Court ruled that state laws which deny mentally competent patients who seek to end their lives during the final stages of a terminal illness through the assistance of a physician deny such patients the equal protection of the laws in violation of the United States Constitution. Because the Second Circuit includes the states of New York, Connecticut and Vermont, its decision also affects a significant number of Americans. The New York law challenged by several physicians and by three terminally ill patients: "Jane", a 76-year-old retired physical education instructor who was dying of thyroid cancer; George Kingsley, a 48-year-old publishing executive suffering from AIDS; and William Barth, a 28-year-old fashion editor under treatment for AIDS. Friend of the Court briefs were also filed by many of the organizations that filed similar briefs in Compassion in Dying v. State, including United States Catholic Conference, American United for Life, Lamda Legal Defense and Education Fund, National Association of People with AIDS, Americans for Death with Dignity, and Hemlock S.ociety.
The Second Circuit Court specifically rejected the claim that physicianassisted suicide was a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In doing so, the Seo:md Circuit Court's opinion could be said to significantly undermine the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit's decision. The Second Circuit Court observed that ' ''rights that have no textual support in the language of the Constitution but qualify for heightened judicial protection include fundamental liberties so 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed'" (p. 9). The court went on to conclude that "the right contended for here cannot be considered so implicit in our understanding of ordered liberty that neither justice nor liberty would exist if it were sacrificed. Nor can it be said that the right to assisted suicide claimed by plaintiffs is deeply rooted in the nation's traditions and history. Indeed, the very opposite is true. The Common Law of England, as received by the American colonies, prohibited suicide and attempted suicide. Although neither suicide nor attempted suicide is any longer a crime inthe United States, 32 states, including New York, continue to make assisted suicide an offense" (p. 10).
Moreover, the Second Circuit Court continued its different approach than that of the Ninth Circuit by finding that New York's criminal prohibition of physician-assisted suicide constituted a violation of the equal protection of the law. The court stated that this guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment "simply requires the states to treat in a similar manner all individuals who are similarly situated" (p. 11). The court arrived at its conclusion invalidating the law through a tenous process of generalization, refusing to consider distinctions in the medical circumstance among various terminally-ill patients and instead considering all terminally-ill patients who sought to "hasten" their death to be "similarly situated". The court dismissed any significant difference under the law between two types of decisions which the law had always recognized as profoundly different; that is, the difference between the decision to refuse or withdraw certain medical treatments and the decision to administer death-causing drugs with the intention to thereby cause the death of the patient. In doing so, the court ignored important distinctions that both medicine and law had traditionally recognized and instead generalized that all such decisions would be considered under a single category of decisions to "hasten death".
The court placed great emphasis in its analysis upon the fact that the New York legislature in 1990 enacted a new law to allow a person to sign a "health care proxy" to appoint an agent with "authority to make any and all health care decisions" on the person's behalf including "those relating to the administration of artificial nutrition and hydration."24 As a result of the passage of this statute, the court ruled that "New York does not treat similarly circumstanced persons alike: those in the final stages of terminal illness who are on life-support systems are allowed to hasten their deaths by directing the removal of such systems' but those who are similarly situated, except for the previous attachment of lifesustaining equipment, are not allowed to hasten death by self-administering prescribed drugs" (p. 16-17). Thus, the court held that there is no legally relevant distinction between assisted suicide and the withdrawal or withholding of lifesustaining medical treatment.
The court stated, "Indeed, there is nothing 'natural' about causing death by means other than the original illness or its complications. The withdrawal of hydration brings on death by dehyration, and the withdrawal of ventilation brings about respiration failure. By ordering the discontinuance of these artificial life-sustaining processes or refusing to accept them in the first place, a patient hastens his death that by means that are not naturall in any sense. It certainly cannot be said that the death that immediately ensues is the natural result of the progression of the disease or condition from which the patient suffers" (p. 17). Whether or not it can be said that the death that ensues is the "natural" result of the patient's medical condition, the medical condition is directly related to the inability of the patient to perform the function "naturally" that is being provided by artificial means. That is a circumstance of the patient which has always been regarded as significant for both medical and legal purposes. Moreover, those who justify the termination of such procedures from the standpoint of medical ethics do so essentially on the basis that such procedures have become excessively burdensome to the patient or have become futile . They are not justified on the basis that they are necessary to hasten the death of the patient. Thus, the court was only able to reach its conclusion by overturning distinctions which both medicine and law have historically recognized as vital.
Moreover the court in Quill v. Vacca misconstrued the nature of the liberty interest involved in the right to refuse medical treatment by failing to appreciate the relationship of such a right to the principle of bodily integrity ... Suicide enjoys no such foundational support, however. When one acts to end one's life, it is the intrusion of the lethal agent that violates bodily integrity."25 The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law reached a similar conclusion when it found that, "The imposition oflife-sustaining medical treatment against a patient's will requires a direct invasion of bodily integrity and, in some cases, the use of physical restraints, both of which are flatly inconsistent with society'S basic conception of personal dignity . . . It is this right against intrusion -not a general right to control the timing and manner of death -that forms the basis of the constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining treatment." 26 Finally, the circuit court dismissed the state's interest in protecting human life in such circumstances. It stated that "the state's oontention has been that its primary interest is in preserving the life of all its citizens at all times and under all conditions. But what interest can the state posSJibly have in requiring the prolongation of a life that is all but ended? Surely, the: state's interest lessens as the potential for life diminishes ... What concern prompts the state to interfere with a mentally competent patient's 'right to define [his] own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life'" (p.17-18). While it is true that the court's language addresses the circumstances of a mentally competent patient suffering a terminal illness, it must also be recognized that the court's premise, that "the state's interest lessens as the potential for life diminishes", is surely one which cannot logically be limited to the situation of termi.nal illness or to !he me~tally competent patient. Certainly, the mentally handicapped, the phYSically disabled and the elderly all experience in significant ways a "diminishing" in their "potential" for life. Many of these citizens also exper~ence a "dimi?ishing" ability to "define [ their] own concept of existence, of meamng, of the umverse, and of the mystery of human life." To recognize in the law a conc~rrent "lessening" in the state's interest in protecting such life, as the court does, IS a dangerous precedent.
Conclusion

Although the circuit courts in both Compassion in Dying v. State and Quill v.
Vacco asserted that the physician-assisted suicide of mentally competent, terminally ill patients was protected by the United States Constitution, the fact that both courts reached this conclusion through different and potentially contradictory rationales highlights the tenuous link between suicide and the protections of American constitutional law. The equal protection ofthe law rationale used in Quill v. Vacco appears to rest almost entirely upon the circuit court's strained approach to the realities of medical care at the end of life by ignoring the very real distinctions between decisions to withdraw burdensome or futile procedures and affirmative actions undertaken with the intention of killing the patient. One cannot expect that such judicial reasoning can endure over time -constitutional law, like the practice of medicine, is dependent upon specificity and the recognition of difference, not the reverse.
The rationale of the circuit courts in both cases regarding the interest of the state in protecting human life is considerably more troublesome from the standpoint of constitutional law. Both courts seem to have accepted the contention of the dissenting Supreme Court justices in Cruzan that the state's general interest in life must accede to the patient's particularized interest. Such a view suggests that the state's interest in protecting life is controlling only when unnecessary; that is, only when there is no contlict between the interest of the state and the desire of the individual. At other times, when there is a conflict, the individual interest in choosing death must be recognized as paramount. Both courts also suggested that the interest of the state in protecting life exists only according to some type of sliding-scale: the state's interest in life is regulated by the patient's potential for life. When the patient's potential for life dimishes so also must the state's interest in the protection of that life diminish. For most of American constitutional history, however, American society has viewed the right to life as "inalienable." One difficulty presented by the courts' opinions in these cases is that if the right to life is now held to be "alienable" by the individual who "possesses" the right, it is also logically "alienable" by others and may one day be so in fact. Couple this dramatic shift in the law with the corresponding weakening of the state's interest in preserving life and American society may be set adrift on dangerous seas.
The United States Supreme Court may still avoid this difficulty by refusing to extend the reach of constitutional protections to physician-assisted suicide. As one commentator has observed, "A Court that refused to 'constitutionalize' a 'right to die' broad enough to uphold the claims of the Cruzan family is hardly likely to 'constitutionalize' a right to assisted suicide."27 In that regard it is significant that the Supreme Court's opinion in Cruzan specifically cited the existence of state laws prohibiting assisted suicide as evidence of the state's longstanding interest in the protection of human life. Moreover, all eight justices were silent regarding any purported "right" to suicide within the factual circumstances presented by the medical situation of Nancy Cruzan in the face of Justice Scalia's assertion that "there is no significant support for the claim that a right to suicide is so rooted in our tradition that it may be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'."
Compassion in Dying v. State and Quill v. Vacco both entirely overlook two important realities constitutive of the practice of medicine in the United States today: one is psychological and the other is economic.
The first reality has been known for some time by physicians and can be summarized as follows: "A request for hastened death may be a way of saying that one does not feel worthy of great attention from the family .. . The request for euthanasia or assisted suicide may also be a means for patients to ask whether they continue to be valued, and whether the burden of illness remains manageable and the tasks of care meaningful. Helping patients to die quickly in such a situation does not represent a recognition of their autonomy; it simply confirms their sense of worthlessness and abandonment."28 To establish a new assisted right-to-die in this context may only serve to further enhance this sense uf diminished self-worth.
The second reality involves the economics of medicine at the end oflife. In the United States the government-sponsored health program for the elderly, Medicare, consistently experiences large expenditures for patients at the end of life. Studies have shown that between 27 to 30 percent of payments for medical services under the Medicare program are to the five to six percent of Medicare patients who die in that year. For example, in 1988, the mean Medicare payment during the last year of a patient's life was $13,316 as compared with $1 ,924 CoJr all other Medicare patients -a ratio of nearly seven to one. 29 Numerous studies have been undertaken to estimate the amount of financial savings possible to both government and nongovernment health care programs from the greater use of health care proxies (advance directives), hospice care and "less aggressive interventions". While such estimates vary, one study using 1990 expenditures estimated that between $55 billion and $109 billion might be saved "from a policy of asking all patients about their wishes regarding life-sustaining treatment and incorporating those wishes into advanced directive."30 Others maintain that the cost savings to be achieved "by reducing the use of aggressive life-sustaining intervention for dying patients" will be much less, for example, only 3.3 percent of total national health care expenditures" -a percentage estimated to save $29.7 billion in 1993. 31 The present economic context for the delivery of health care services in the United States is one in which government increasingly demands substantial costsavings in government-financed health care services. At the same time, an increasingly important number of American hospitals are abandoning their traditional character as not-for-profit, charitable institutions in order to become for-profit corporations. In such an economic climate, it cannot be reasonably assumed that the incentive of potential cost savings of $29 billion to $109 billion coupled with a newly established "right" to physician .. assisted suicide will not invite varying levels of exploitation of the poor, the elderly, and the handicapped in the name of patient autonomy and death with dignity.
What is also striking about the reasoning of the courts in Compassion in Dying v. State and Quilly v. Vacco is their reliance upon the abortion jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in its most recent articulation in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. In his now classic treatise on American law, Justice Benjamin Cardozo observed that a judicial principle will tend "to expand itself to the limit of its logic."32 The purported expansion of the abortion "liberty" to mandate a "liberty" interest in physicianassisted suicide is a tragic example of Card ow's maxim. Yet it was predicted with surprising accuracy more than twenty-five years ago by the editors of California Medicine, the journal of the California Medical Association, when they wrote, "The traditional Western ethic has always placed great emphasis on the intrinsic worth and equal value of every human life regardless of its stage or condition ... The reverence for each and every human life has also been a keystone of Western medicine and is the ethic which has caused physicians to try to preserve, protect, repair, prolong, and enhance every human life which comes under their surveillance. This traditional ethic is still clearly dominant, but ... it is being eroded at its core and may eventually even be abandoned ... The process of eroding the old ethic and substituting the new has already begun. It may be seen most clearly in changing attitudes toward human abortion ... The part which medicine will playas all this develops is not yet entirely clear. That it will be deeply involved is certain. Medicine's role with respect to changing attitudes toward abortion may well be a prototype of what is to occur ... One may anticipate further development of these roles as the problems of birth control and birth selection are extended inevitably to death selection and death control whether by the individual or by society . .. "33 To say that this "new" ethic has a logic within it which makes certain developments inevitable is not to say that the ethic itself is inevitable.
In Compassion in Dying v. State and Quill v. Vaceo, two federal circuit courts have sought to enshrine this "new" ethic in the United States Constitution so as to control decisions concerning the end of life. It is easy for some at times to view the "old" ethic as one primarily derived from Christian or, more specifically, Catholic sources and the "new" ethic as derived from "neutral" and "secular" sources. Indeed, a significant portion of the circuit court's language in Compassion in Dying would suggest just such a view. Yet the emergence of Hippocrates and his Oath in the Western tradition of medicine derives entirely from non-Christian sources. The Ninth Circuit Court's attempt to banish the Hippocratic Oath from such life and death decisions by claiming that it "originated in a group representing only a small segment of Greek opinion and that it certainly was not accepted by all ancient physicians" (p. 31) misconstrues both the direction and dynamic of history. Regardless of how many ancient physicians immediately agreed with Hippocrates, the Hippocratic Oath became the measure of Western medicine for the same reason that democracy and the classical ideal in sculpture arose in fifth century Athens -it was the only response which conformed to the dignity of the human person as a free and moral SUbject. Margaret Mead summarized this dynamic as follows: "Throughout the primitive world the doctor and the sorcerer tended to be the same person. He with the power to kill had the power to cure, including specially the undoing of his own killing activities. He who had the power to cure would necessarily also be able to kill. With the Greeks [the Hippocratic Oath] the distinction was made clear. One profession, the followers of Asclepias, were to be dedicated completely to life under all circumstances, regardless of rank, age, or intellect -the life of a slave, the life of the Emperor, the life of a foreign man, the life of a defective child ... [TJhis is a priceless always August, 1996 possession which we cannot afford to tarnish, but society always is attempting to make the physician a killer."34 Many in the ancient world embraced the teaching of Hippocrates because of his affirmation of the moral equality and dignity of his patients as human persons. It is for those very reasons that many today are willing to wait for him still.
